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The Reemergence of German Arms:
How Far Will Germany's March Toward
Full Use of Military Force Go?
ABSTRACT

In 1994, the German Federal Constitutional Court
handed down a landmark decision redefining the
constitutionality of German use of military force. For more
than forty years, the German government claimed that the
German Constitutionforbade the use of military forces for
other than the defense of NATO territory. The Federal

Constitutional Court, however, held that a majority vote of
Parliament was all that was required to commit forces to
military actions sanctioned by collective security agreements.
In 1995,for the first time since World War 11, Germany sent
offensive military forces into a combat zone. These events
raise the question of how far Germany will go toward
unrestricted use of militaryforce as a tool of foreign policy.
This Note begins with a summary of the history of restrictions
on German use of military force from their genesis in the
World War 11 Treaty of Surrender to their recent redefinition in
the 1994 Federal Constitutional Court decision. The author
examines Germany's current collective security agreements
and their potential effect on future use of force. The Note
continues by reviewing relevant social and political factors
bearing on German decision making, both within Germany
and in the internationalcommunity as a whole. In conclusion,
the author analyzes the range of use of force options now
available to Germany and predicts which option the German
Parliamentis most likely to adopt.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Asked what he considered the most dangerous weapon in
Europe, Winston Churchill once responded, "A German military

band."'

After the destruction of two world wars precipitated by

German military aggression, no one can blame Churchill or his
contemporaries for fearing the potential return of German
militarism. Many considered the German people to be inherently

militaristic. 2 After World War II, fear of renewed German
expansionism led the victorious Allied powers to severely restrict
The Allies
the fielding and use of German military forces.
enforced the restrictions first by treaty and later through an Allied
sponsored constitution, known as the Basic Law, for the newly
created Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).3 For over forty years,
the FRG government interpreted the Basic Law to mean that
German military forces could only be used for defensive purposes
on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory. 4 After
suffering two humiliating defeats in less than thirty years, the
German people were tired of war. Following World War II, a wave
of pacifism took hold in Germany that persists, in many ways, to
the present day.5 The attitude of the German people underscored
the German government's interpretation of the Basic Law's
restrictions on the use of force.

John F. Farmer, Germany'sReturn to Leadershlp Stirs Unease, NEWARK
1.
STAR-LEDGER, July 17, 1994, available in 1994 WL 12472426.
John Dornberg. Germany Should Redefine Military Role, PORTLAND
2.
OREGONIAN, May 13, 1993, at DlI, available in 1993 WL 6912291. According to

David Large:
Another problem was that the victors, especially the Americans, tended to
oversimplify the issues they were dealing with. They tended to see the
German war machine as the culmination of three hundred years of
Prusso-German military history. In this view, the Nazis were the heirs of a
unilinear tradition beginning with the Great Elector in the mid-

seventeenth century; Hitler's attempt to conquer all of Europe was the
"latest stage of Prussian militarism."

American policy makers believed

that the only way to end this pattern of "militaristic aggression" was to
insist upon a thorough "demilitarization of the German mind."
David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the
Adenauer Era 13 (1996) (footnote omitted).
Grundgesetz [Constitution] [G.G.] (F.R.G.), translated in David P.
3.
Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (1994) [hereinafter
GGI.
Mary Williams Walsh, German Military Inches its Way Back Toward
4.
Global Battlefields; Focus: A Tortured Debate in Bonn, Montreal Gazette, June 27,
1995, at BI, available in 1995 WL 6968856.
5.
Marc Fisher, Germany Gropes Toward New Military Role; Nazi Past
Colors Debate Over Nation's Responsibilities in Conflicts Beyond Its Borders, Wash.
Post, February 23, 1992, at A27.
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Over the years, German reluctance to engage in offensive
military action has resulted in increasing pressure from some of
Germany's allies to supply what they consider to be the Germans'
fair share of military force. Some commentators have gone so far

as to

Icharge]

the Germans

with

hiding behind

their

constitution."6 Not only has Germany's refusal to militarily assist
its allies resulted in antagonism, it has also reduced the
effectiveness of United Nations (U.N.) and NATO missions. 7
Recently, growing international pressure and a German desire to
have greater influence in international affairs, convinced the
German government to begin reducing restrictions on the use of
military forces. 8 These gradual changes to long-standing policy
resulted in legal actions brought by the opposition party in the
Federal Constitutional Court (FCC).9
On July 12, 1994, in a landmark decision, the German FCC
ruled that the use of German forces to support internationally
sponsored military operations outside of NATO territory does not
violate the Basic Law.' 0 The court held that forces could be
dispatched to support United Nations, NATO, and Western
European Union (WEU) missions as long as a simple majority of
Parliament approved." The decision marked a major departure
from the government's previously held interpretation of the Basic
Law. It freed Germany to use military forces in collective security
arrangements and "remove[d] the last major barrier to a German
foreign policy based on national interest-the kind of foreign

6.
Germany's Expanding Role, Salt Lake Trib., July 15, 1994, at A14,
available In 1994 WL 738240.
7.

Yes, Let Germany Rejoin the World. Milwaukee J.. July 16, 1994, at As,

available In 1994 WL 8283372.
8.
Rick Atkinson, Luftwaffe's Wings Clipped in First Action Since 1945,
Wash. Post, August 19, 1995, at A15. The tentative German forays into out-ofarea use of military force included sending military medical teams to Cambodia. a
force of engineers to Somalia, and providing part of the crew of NATO-run
airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft flying surveillance
missions in support of U.N. operations in the Balkans. Id.
9.
Federal Constitutional Court Approves Expanded International Role for
German Military, Wk. in Germany High Tech, July 15, 1994, available in 1994 WL
2219817 [hereinafter High Tech]. The opposition brought three lawsuits against
the coalition government to test the constitutionality of out-of-area German
military deployments. The suits were based on the government's commitment of
naval forces to assist in the U.N. sponsored embargo of Yugoslavia, the
deployment of combat engineers to assist in U.N. operations in Somalia, and the
use of German air force officers as part of the crews of NATO AWACS aircraft
performing surveillance operations over the Adriatic. Id.
10.
Neve Jurlstische Wochenschrift IN.J.W.] 24 (1994). 2207 (2207).
11.
High Tech, supra note 9.
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the world's other major powers pursue as a matter of
policy that
12

course."
The German government did not have to wait long to test this
On June 30, 1995, the German
new foreign policy option.
Parliament voted to send combat forces to support U.N.
operations in Bosnia. The vote marked the first use of German
forces outside of NATO territory in a potential combat role since
the end of World War II. 1 Now that Germany has taken the first
tentative step toward sovereign use of force, the question on many
minds is: How far will Germany go toward full use of its armed
forces as a tool of foreign policy?
It begins with a
This Note will address that question.
discussion of the evolution of legal constraints on German use of
military force, beginning with the Allied terms of surrender after
World War II and concluding with the FCC's decision in 1994.
The Note then analyzes the current social and political factors
bearing on an expanded use of military force, including those
internal to Germany and those driven by the international
community. Finally, the Note discusses various foreign policy
options for German military use and identifies those that are most
likely to be pursued in light of current legal restrictions and the
social and political climate.

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF LEGAL CONSTRAINTS BEARING ON THE GERMAN

USE OF MILITARY FORCE
The current legal restraints on the German military have
their roots in the restrictions levied by the victorious Allies at the
end of World War II. 14 Originally enforced through the treaty of
surrender and subsequent occupation legislation, the same
concept of military restraint continued in the Allied-approved
Basic Law of the newly-formed FRG. 15 As a result of the unique
German constitutionalism, 16 the government's
nature of
Gary L. Geipel, A German Foreign Policy Based on National Interest.
12.
Indianapolis Star, July 26. 1994. at A5. The decision is critical to German foreign
policy even if the option to deploy forces is never used. The key is that it removes
the "convenient" constitutional bar that spared German politicians the difficulty of
considering the use of force along with every other foreign policy option. German
leaders will now need to review the "military option" in foreign policy decisions.

Id.
Germany Takes Bosnia Role, S. F. EXAMINER, June 30, 1995, at A34.
13.
"The vote was needed to ratify a cabinet decision to send 1,500 soldiers, Tornado
jet fighters, transport aircraft and a field hospital to support the United Nations'
new rapid reaction force in former Yugoslavia." Id.
See Infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
14.
See Infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
15.
As explained by Professor Kommers:
16.
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interpretation of those restrictions has represented the primary
impediment to German sovereign use of military force for the last
forty years.
This section describes restrictions on German
military use under international law and provides an analysis of
the development of internal restraints concentrated in the
German Basic Law.
A. The Birth of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Basic Law
In 1945, the end of World War II brought the total defeat of
Germany and its subsequent unconditional surrender.
Given
that war's unprecedented destruction, Allied governments were
wary of renewed German militarism. Article 2 of the Declaration
Regarding the Defeat of Germany demanded the immediate
demilitarization of all German forces. 17 Article 13 gave Allied
governments the authority to forbid the rearming of Germany as
long as "they deem[ed] requisite for future peace and security."' 8
The demilitarization of Germany was complete and was intended
1 9
to be long term.

. . . any law. administrative regulation, legal relationship, or political
practice that cannot be justified in terms of the Basic Law is by definition
unconstitutional and, in the German variant of the constitutional state, it
must be so declared if the order of legality and legal certainty-among the
highest values of the German Rechtsstaat-is to be maintained.
Donald P. Kommers, German Constltutionallsm: A Prolegomenon, 40 EMoRY L. J.
837, 848 (1991).
17.
Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany and the Assumption of
Supreme Authority with Respect to Germany, June 5. 1945, art. 2, para. (a), 60
Stat. 1649, 1651, 68 U.N.T.S. 189, 192. Article 2 provides:
All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may
be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the SS.,
S.A., and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organisations equipped
with weapons, shall be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons
and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the
Allied Representatives.
18.
19.

Id. art. 13, para. (a).
David Large describes the "draconian" demilitarization measures:

. . . the [Allies] prohibited Germans from wearing their old military
uniforms ...displaying military rank, medals, and insignia; belonging to
any veterans organizations, regimental associations, or sport groups with
a military character; possessing weapons, munitions, or explosives;
planning, constructing, or maintaining military facilities of any kind;
conducting scientific or historical research of a military nature;
maintaining commemorative plaques, monuments, statues, buildings, or
street designations that might keep alive the German military tradition;
and operating exhibitions or museums focusing on German military
history since 1914. Libraries and educational institutions were ordered to
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For four years, Germany remained divided and under Allied
military control with no meaningful self-government. In 1949,
following a failure to come to terms with the Soviet Union, 20 the

western Allies decided to unite their three occupation zones to
create the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As part of that
decision, the Allies authorized German representatives to convene
an organization to create a constitution for the FRG. 2 1 The Allies
required that the resulting constitution conform to certain

specified requirements and be approved by the Military Governors

before being presented to the German states for ratification. 2 2 In
addition, the Allies retained authority to continue to enforce
disarmament. 2 3 Although the German constitutional convention
was theoretically free to define the constitution, these restrictions
ensured that they would define it in a manner acceptable to the
As a result, the final Basic Law contained explicit
Allies.2 4
restraints on the sovereign use of military force.
The general view is that constitutional restraints on military
use were required by the Allies to prevent future German
militarism. 25 Three articles of the original Basic Law restrict
Germany's ability to use military force. Article 26 forbids acts
with the "intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations"
and provides criminal sanctions for its violation. 26 This article

purge their collections of any materials that might be used for the
preservation of Germany's war-making potential.
supranote 2. at 25.
Following the surrender of Germany, the country was divided into four
20.
zones of occupation each of which was governed by one of the four victorious
Allied powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
France). The original intent was to reunite the four occupation zones, but
disagreements between the western powers and the Soviet Union made this
LARGE,

impossible.
21.

Final Communiqu6 on London Talks Regarding Germany (June 1,

1948). reprinted In CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION. OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FOR GERMANY, DOCUMENTS ON THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 42-43

(Sept. 1. 1949) [hereinafter London Talks].
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
As Dr. Carlo Schmid, a delegate from the Social Democratic Party,
24.
eloquently stated, "A constitution which has to be approved by somebody else
represents the policy of the one entitled to approve it, but does not represent a
true result of the sovereignty of the people of the one who has to obtain approval."
Excepts from the Speech of Dr. Carlo Schmid (SPD) at the Plenary Meeting of the
Parliamentary Council Held in Bonn on 8 September 1948, reprinted in CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION, OFFICE OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT FOR GERMANY,
DOCUMENTS ON THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 78 (Sept. 1,

1949) [hereinafter Schmid Speech].
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control of Military Actions:
25.
Comparative Dimension, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 99 (1991).
26.
GG, supranote 3, art. 26(1).

A
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27
effectively rules out any use of force for "aggressive" purposes.
Article 25 provides that the general rules of public international

law are part of the federal law of Germany and take precedence

over laws enacted by its government. 28 Therefore, to the extent
that any use of military force would violate international law, it
would be unconstitutional. Finally, Article 24 allows Germany to
join collective security agreements for "the maintenance of
peace." 29 Since, at the time, Germany was not yet permitted to
have any military forces, there were no provisions explicitly
controlling the use of military force in the original Basic Law.
In addition to the constitutional restrictions, the Allies
reserved other rights to prevent the reemergence of German
militarism. The Allies approved the Basic Law subject to rights
maintained by them in a separate Occupation Statute. 30 In the
Occupation Statute, the Allies retained the express right to
continue to regulate German disarmament. 3 1 The Allies also
reserved the right to approve any proposed changes to the Basic
Law itself.32

These actions effectively prevented Germany from

establishing any type of military forces for the next five years.
B. NATO and the Rearming of Germany
By 1947, Allied military officers began to consider the
rearming of Germany as a viable method of defending against the
27.

Section 1 of Article 26 provides in full:

Acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful
relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression.
are unconstitutional. They shall be made a criminal offense.

Id.
28.
Id. art. 25.
29.
Id. art. 24(2). Section 2 provides authority for joining organizations for
purposes of collective security:
For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter a system of

mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations

upon its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful
and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.
Id. Section 1 is also important in this context as it states that, "[tihe Federation
may by legislation transfer sovereign powers to intergovernmental Institutions."
Id. This section allows Germany to join an organization for purposes of mutual
collective security and transfer command of its military forces to the organization.
30.
Letter of Approval of the Basic Law (May 12, 1949), reprinted in CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT GERMANY,
DOCUMENTS ON THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTION at 138 (Sept. 1,

1949).
31.
Occupation Statute Defining the Powers to be Retained by the
Occupation Authorities, April 8, 1949, para. 2, reprinted in UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY

32.

Id. para. 5.

1944-1985, at 212 (1985).
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growing Soviet threat.3 3 At the higher levels of Allied government,
34
however, there were no public plans to rearm Germany.
Disarmament was intended to be permanent. 35 By 1950, military
necessity, brought on by the Western Allies' inability to match
Soviet troop strength in Europe, caused the United States to
begin rethinking this policy.3 6 The invasion of South Korea by the
communist-backed forces of North Korea in June of 1950 marked
a turning point. 37 At the time, U.S. planners could easily draw an

analogy between the situation in Korea and a potential Soviet
invasion of West Germany. 3 8
In September of 1950, U.S.
Secretary of State Acheson publicly announced that the United
39
States would seek rearmament of West Germany.
The initial U.S. plan proposed severe restrictions on the
German forces to placate European fears of renewed German
militarism. 40 The French were not satisfied with these controls,
however, and proposed to make German forces part of a combined
European army. The French proposal eventually came to be
known as the European Defense Community (EDC).4 1 Although
negotiations concerning the EDC succeeded in holding up
German rearmament for several years, in the end it received little
42
support from European countries or even the French army.

Ironically, it was the French government that sealed the4 3fate of
the EDC by refusing to ratify the Treaty in August of 1954.

The defeat of the EDC Treaty left the Allies with no method of
integrating German forces into a collective security scheme. To
resolve the situation, Allied leaders met in London at the NinePower Conference in September of 1954. 4 4

At that conference,

they approved a proposal to integrate German forces into NATO
and the WEU. 45

The rules for German accession to the two

collective security pacts were strict.

33.

LARGE, supra note 2, at 35.

34.

ROBERT McGEEHAN,

The German military

THE GERMAN REARMAMENT QUESTION:

AMERICAN

DIPLOMACY AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE AFTER WORLD WAR II 13 (1971).
35.
Id.
36.
See Id. at 27-28 (describing the justification for the potential rearming
of Germany).

37.
Id. at 20-21.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 34.
40.
The German forces were not to operate independently. A German High
Command or General Staff was banned and all the forces would be directly
integrated into NATO. Id. at 43-44.
41.
LARGE, supra note 2, at 92. This plan was also known as the "Pleven

Plan."
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 122.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 217.
Id.
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command structure was fully integrated into NATO and the
Bundeswehr (West German military) had to coordinate all military
46
tasks, deployments, and equipment with NATO Headquarters.
In May of 1955, the Occupation Statute was formally revoked
and Germany was admitted as a member of NATO. 4 7 Internal
German issues, however, still prevented immediate rearmament.
From the establishment of the FRG, the opposition party n the
German Parliament, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), had been
against rearmament. 48 The SPD took the matter to the FCC
arguing that rearmament violated the Basic Law.4 9 In 1956, the
ruling party acquiesced to a "military constitution" by amending
the Basic Law. These amendments codified Parliamentary control
over the military and integrated it into the democratic institutions
of the state. 50
The amendments contained in the "military constitution" set
51
up detailed rules to govern the use of the new armed forces.

The most important of these rules are found in Article 87(a),
Sections 1 and 2. Section 1 provides in part that "[tihe Federation
shall establish Armed Forces for defense purposes."5 2 Section 2
provides that "[alpart from defense, the Armed Forces may be
employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic
Law."5 3 The interpretation of these restrictions has an important

46.

Wolfram F. Hanrieder. The FRG and NATO:

Between Security

Dependence and Security Partnershlp, in THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND
NATO: 40 YEARS AFTER 194, 206 (Emil Kirchner & James Sperling eds., 1992).

For other restrictions on Germany enforced through NATO and WEU membership,
see Id. at 201.
LARGE, supra note 2, at 233.
47.
The SPD wanted to adopt a policy of neutrality in hopes that it would
48.
convince the Soviet Union to allow the reunification of West Germany with East
Germany. The SPD cited four major grounds for opposing rearmament: "it would
damage the prospects for reunification by aligning West German with one of the
cold war camps; it would antagonize the Soviet Union and increase world
tensions; it would support militarist elements in domestic German society; and it
would bring Germany into a conservative West European union that could split
non-Communist Europe." Beverly Crawford & Jost Halfmann, Domestic Politics
and International Change: Germany's Role In Europe's Security Future, In THE
FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITy 216, 225-226 (Beverly Crawford ed., 1992).

LARGE, supra note 2, at 155.
49.
50.
Id. at 251.
51.
Claus Kress, Note, The External Use of German Armed Forces-The
1994 Judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgercht, 44 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 414
(1995).
52.
GG, supra note 3, art. 87a(l) (emphasis added).
Id (emphasis added). In its 1994 decision, the FCC sidestepped the
53.
issue of defining the term "defense" by holding that Article 24 authority to join
collective security agreements predated, and thus superseded, the Article 87(a)(2)
restriction. It is uncertain what restrictions are encompassed by this term. See
infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
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impact on German freedom to use military force as a tool of
foreign policy.
C. German Reunification and the Treaty on Final German
Settlement
After more than forty years of cold war, changes in the
international political climate made the long-awaited reunification
of Germany possible.5 4 Under Article 7 of the Treaty on the Final
Settlement with Respect to Germany (also called the "Two Plus
Four Treaty"), the four World War II Allies extinguished their
remaining rights and privileges, including any authority over the
German military, under the post-war declarations. 5 5 The treaty
paved the way for a united and truly sovereign Germany.
In addition to the general grant of sovereignty over external
affairs in Article 6, the treaty specifically provided that German
rights and responsibilities arising from its alliances would not be
affected. 56 Since Germany had already decided to join NATO after
reunification, this provision allows the united Germany to
continue to act within the NATO charter without violating the
treaty.5 7 Given that Germany was also a member of both the
United Nations and the WEU at the time of the treaty, presumably
this freedom would apply to actions under the charters of those

organizations as well. Although the maximum extent of actions
permissible under the provision is not clear, it is certain that "the
Germans will continue to be able to exercise the right of selfdefense both individually and collectively in pursuit of their

54.

See generally STEPHEN F. SZABO, THE DIPLOMACY OF GERMAN UNIFICATION

(1992) (describing the international event leading up to the reunification of
Germany).
Article 7 of the treaty provides:
55.
(1) The French Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America hereby terminate their rights and responsibilities

relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole. As a result, the
corresponding, related quadripartite agreements, decisions and practices
are terminated and all related Four Power institutions are dissolved.
(2) The united Germany shall have accordingly full sovereignty over its
internal and external affairs.
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, art. 7, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 101-20, 29 I.L.M. 1186, 1191 (1990) [hereinafter Two plus Four
Treaty].
56.
Article 6 provided that "[tihe right of the united Germany to belong to
alliances, with all the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom, shall not be
affected by the present treaty." Id. art. 6.
57.
Peter E. Quint, The ConstitutionalLaw of German Unification, 50 MD. L.
REv. 475, 617 (1991).
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obligations 58to NATO, the United Nations, and other
institutions."
The treaty also reaffirms Germany's commitment to peaceful
relations and renunciation of aggressive warfare as a tool of
national policy. In Article 2, Germany declares that it will "never
employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its
constitution and the Charter of the United Nations."5 9 Since the
text of Article 2 tracks the text of Article 26, Section 1 of the Basic
Law, 60 the treaty could be read to prohibit Germany from ever
significantly changing or deleting that article.
Some legal
scholars have suggested that the treaty may provide authority for
international enforcement in a situation where Germany violates
that constitutional provision. 6 1 The U.S. government's position,
however, appears to be that the only restrictions on German use
of military force emanate from the German Constitution and not
from the treaty or any other external authority.62
This
interpretation, coupled with the Article 7 relinquishment of Allied
authority, provides Germany with the opportunity to alter the
Basic Law to reduce or eliminate its restrictions on the use of
force.
Germany could make such a change by either amending the
Basic Law 6 3 or adopting a new "permanent" constitution for the

58.
Implications of Treaty on Final German Settlementfor NATO Strategy and
U.S. Military Presence in Europe: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services
of the United States Senate, 101-25 (1990) [hereinafter Settlement Treaty Hearings)
(statement of Hon. James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Canadian Affairs) (emphasis added).
59.
Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 55, art. 2. The full text of Article 2
reads:
The Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German
Democratic Republic reaffIrm their declarations that only peace will
emanate from German soil. According to the constitution of the united
Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the
peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for aggressive
war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offen[sle. The Governments of
the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic
declare that the united Germany will never employ any of its weapons
except in accordance with its constitution and the Charter of the United
Nations.
Id.
60.
See supra note 27 (text of Article 26(1) of the Basic Law).
61.
Quint, supra note 57, at 614.
62.
Settlement Treaty Hearings, supra note 58, at 24 (statement of Hon.
James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Canadian Affairs).
63.
'An amendment would require a two-thirds vote of both houses of the
German Parliament. GG, supra note 3, art. 79(2). However, there is nothing In
the treaty that prohibits Germany from approving an amendment to reduce the
limitations on military use, and prior to the 1994 FCC decision, the current
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united Germany.64 Article 146 of the Basic Law was included to
facilitate the replacement of the Basic Law with a permanent
65
constitution approved by a united German people.
Reunification, however, was not achieved under Article 146.66
Instead, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) joined the FRG
under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which provided for the
"accession" of other parts of Germany. 6 7 Nevertheless, to appease

government indicated a willingness to pursue such an option after reunification
was complete. Settlement Treaty Hearings, supra note 58, at 25 (statement of
Hon. James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs).
The need for an amendment has been partially alleviated by the FCC decision.
See infra notes 70-103 and accompanying text. To the extent that the
government may want to amend the Basic Law to allow use of force beyond the
scope of that decision, it is unlikely that the needed two-thirds majority of
Parliament could ever be achieved. The opposition of many members to increased
use of external force and the total opposition by third parties to any use of
military force would make the two-thirds majority difficult to obtain. Peter
Schmidt, German Strategic Options, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 25, 3233 (Christoph Bluth et al. eds., 1995).
64.
The FRG constitution was not intended to be a permanent document;
rather, itwas designed to be a temporary constitution for West Germany while the
Paul M. Schwartz,
country remained divided and under Allied control.
Constitutional Change and Constitutional Legitimization: The Example of German
Unification. 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1080 (1994). Schwartz contends that, Itlhe
temporary nature of this document is indicated by its name, Basic Law
(Grundgesetz) rather than Constitution (Verfassung) .

.

. ."

Id.

This idea is

confirmed by some of the legislative history of the Basic Law. Dr. Carlo Schmid of
the SPD stated during the debate:
Where only a partial exercise of the sovereignty of the people is possible,
only the fragment of a state can be established.... The only thing we can
do is to create a Basic Law for the fragment of a state. The real
constitution we have is,even today, the written or unwritten Occupation
Statute.
Schmid Speech. supra note 24, at 78. From the very beginning, factions of the
German government believed it would be necessary to create a new constitution
to complete the reunification process. Dr. Schmid emphasized this point, stating
that, "[tihe future constitution for Germany as a whole should not be produced by

amending the Basic Law of this fragment of a state; it must be made possible that
this final constitution should originate independently." Id.
65.
Prior to the amendments associated with the reunification of Germany,

Article 146 provided: "[this Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day on
which a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into
force." GG art. 146 (F.R.G.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIC RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC
LAWv WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 306 (Ulch Karpen ed., 1988). This
provision provided for both a method of reunification and a smooth transition
from the Basic Law to a constitution for a unified Germany. Quint, supra note 57,
at 508.
66.
Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1085.
67.
Prior to the amendments associated with the reunification of Germany.
Article 23 provided: "For the time being, this Basic Law shall apply in the
territory of the Laender of [list of West German states]. In other parts of Germany
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those factions in the FRG Parliament who supported the idea that
a united Germany should have a new constitution, Article 146
was amended
to
ensure
its continued
validity after
68
reunification.
It is uncertain when, or if, Article 146 might be used to
replace the Basic Law with a new German Constitution. If such
an effort is undertaken, however, it presents important
possibilities for change in the very fabric of the constitution.
Because Article 146 does not provide a specific method for
approval of the new constitution, some scholars argue that it
could be approved by a simple majority of the German people.
This method of change would bypass the supermajority needed in
Parliament to amend the current Basic Law.6 9 If a majority of the
German people ever believe that the time has come to remove
some of the limitations on the use of military forces, Article 146
provides another method to accomplish that goal.
For the
present, however, the restrictions in the Basic Law continue to
govern the actions of the united Germany.
D. The Federal ConstitutionalCourtDecision of 1994
From the inception of the Bundeswehr until the late 1980s,
the various factions of the German government agreed that the
FRG's forces could only be used for defensive purposes on NATO
territory. 70
Following the Gulf War, the ruling coalition in
Parliament began to approve limited operations in support of
NATO and U.N. peacekeeping missions. 7 1 These actions were
vigorously denounced by the opposition parties in the German
Parliament

as

unconstitutional. 72

In

response,

the

ruling

coalition invoked Article 24 and defended the missions as actions
73
under the auspices of collective security agreements.

it shall be put into force on their accession." GG art. 23 (F.R.G.), translatedIn THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ESSAYS ON THE BASIS RIGHTS
AND PRINCIPLES OF THE BASIC LAW WITH A TRANSLATION OF THE BASIC LAW 237 (Ulrich
Karpen ed., 1988). This method of unification allowed the GDR to accept the
Basic Law as the constitution of a united Germany and eliminated the necessity
of creating a new constitution. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 1085.
68.
Quint. supra note 57, at 514-15. Article 146 currently provides: "This
Basic Law, which Is valid for the entire German people following achievement of
the unity and freedom of Germany, shall cease to be In force on the day on which
a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people takes effect." GG,
supra note 3, art. 146.
69.
Quint, supranote 57, at 515.
70.
Kress, supra note 51, at 414.
71.
See Infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.

72.
73.

HIGH TECH, supra note 9.
Id.
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Eventually the FCC accepted the issue for final resolution. 74 On
July 12, 1994, the FCC issued a landmark decision which
75
redefined German doctrine on the use of military force.
The FCC, relying on Article 24, held that the use of German
forces to support the contested actions was constitutional. 7 6 The
court found unanimously that the constitutional authorization to
enter collective security agreements implied the right to support
the military activities required by such a system. 77 The court
concluded that the use of armed forces was inherent in any
security system and relied on the legislative history of the
constitution to find that the drafters had intended such a
consequence. 78 As a result, the court stated that Parliament's
approval of accession to the agreement was sufficient, under
Article 24, Section 1, to put German forces under the system's
command and allow them to engage in military operations
sanctioned by the charter of the organization. 79 The court held
that such action was authorized even where the organization was
80
acting on behalf of another security organization.
The FCC went on to give the term "system of mutual
collective security"8 ' broad scope to include both those alliances
intended to maintain order among members (such as the United
Nations), and those primarily intended to protect members from
outside attack (such as NATO).8 2 In addition, the court found
that the right to commit forces to collective security arrangements
included the authority to use them in military actions whenever
those organizations had authority to operate, thus discrediting
the widely held belief that German forces could only be used on
83
NATO territory.
The FCC dispatched two major arguments made by those

opposing the military actions. The first argument regarded the
74.
The Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party brought the action
on behalf of themselves and the Federal Parliament. The three specific actions in

question were German naval actions in the Adriatic to enforce the embargo
against Yugoslavia, German airmen on NATO AWACS planes enforcing the no-fly
zone over Bosnia, and military engineers sent to support the U.N. operation in
Somalia. Kress, supra note 51, at 415.
75.
Manfred H. Wiegandt, Germany's InternationalIntegration: The Rulings
of the German FederalConstitutionalCourt on the MaastrichtTreaty and the Out-ofArea Deployment of German Troops, 10 AM. U. J. INT'LL. & PoL'Y 889, 890 (1995).
76.
Id. at 906-907.
77.
Id. at 906.
78.
Kress, supra note 51, at 416.
79.
Wiegandt, supra note 75, at 906.
80.
In this case, NATO was acting on behalf of the United Nations in
Bosnia. Id. at 907.
81.
GG, supra note 3, art. 24.
82.
Kress, supra note 51, at 418.
83.
Craig R. Whitney, Court Lifts Restriction on Missions Abroad, L. A. DAILY
NEWs, July 13, 1994, at Ni.
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interplay between Article 24 and the command in Article 87a,
Section 2 that, "[alpart from defense, the Armed Forces may be
employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this basic

law."84

The opposition argued that since Article 24 did not

expressly permit the use of force for non-defensive purposes, the
actions were therefore unconstitutional. The court responded by
invoking a "first in time" doctrine, saying that the defense
purposes caveat was subordinate in time to the collective security
provision. 85 Disregarding the majority of scholarly opinions, the
court found that Article 87a was intended to regulate the
domestic actions of the German military during emergency
situations, and not to regulate its use in the international
arena. 86 Ignoring the fact that Article 87a was adopted during a
period when German government would not have considered use
of forces for other than the defense of NATO territory, 8 7 the court
held that Article 87a did not exclude deployments within collective
security agreements. 88 The FCC avoided discussion of whether
U.N. interventions (such as in Somalia) could be considered
"defensive" and
left the term in Article 87a open to
89
interpretation.
Second, the opposition advanced the argument that NATO
and WEU forces in the former Yugoslavia were acting outside the
bounds of their charter. 90 Since the German parliament had not
agreed to these "changes" in the charter as required by Article
59,91 the opposition reasoned that the actions were outside the
authority of Article 24. The court's response to this argument
was less decisive. By an equally divided vote, 92 the court held
that Parliament understands the basic goals of treaties that it
approves and implicitly approves any later differences in treaty
93
interpretation as long as they remain within those basic goals.
This is true even if the differences in interpretation amount to an

84.
GG, supra note 3, art. 87a(2).
85.
Captain Kenneth S. Kilimnik, Germany'sArmy after Reun!ftcatlon: The
Merging of the Nationale Volksarmee In the Bundeswehr, 1990-1994, 145 MIL. L.
REV. 113, 128 (1994).
86.
Wiegandt, supra note 75,at 907-08.
87.
Id. at 908.
88.
Id. at 907.
89.
Id. at 908-09.
90.
Id. at 909.
91.
Section 2 of Article 59 provides in part: "Treaties that regulate the
political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation
require the consent or participation. in the form of federal statute, of the bodies
competent in any specific case for such federal legislation." GG, supra note 3,
art. 59(2).
92.
Under FCC procedure, a tie vote results in the actions of the
government being upheld as constitutional. Wiegnadt, supra note 75, at 910.
93.
Id.
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effective amendment of the treaty. 94 The court held that the
Parliament implicitly approved the actions by NATO and the WEU
95
through Germany's accession to those organizations.
The FCC placed one restriction on the deployment of German
forces. Any military action must be approved by a majority of the
votes cast in Parliament before or immediately after the action is
taken. 96 The court cited no explicit provision of the constitution
to support this rule. 9 7 Instead, it stated that parliamentary
control of the military was implicit in various parts of the
98
constitution and in the constitutional tradition of Germany.
Parliamentary approval is required even when forces are deployed
to meet alliance obligations, or deployed under the authority of a
U.N. Security Council resolution. 99
The significance of this
requirement should not be overestimated, however. Given the

requirement

for

only a

simple

majority

and

Germany's

parliamentary form of government, any such request is very likely
to be approved.' 0 0
The holdings in this case are particularly important to
interpretation of the Basic Law restrictions on the use of force
because of the unique position occupied by the FCC in German
constitutional law. Germany is a civil law country, and German
courts are not bound by the concept of precedent. The FCC's
interpretations of the Basic Law and its decisions, however, are
binding on all other courts.' 01
In addition, FCC constitutional
interpretation has the force of law and is binding on all other
organs of government and public officials.' 0 2 In essence, the FCC
is charged with "the continuous elaboration of the Constitution's
meaning." 10 3 As a result, the FCC decision conclusively defines
the constitutional restrictions on German use of military force.

94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 911.
96.
Kilimnik, supra note 85, at 128.
97.
Wiegandt, supranote 75, at 911.
98.
Id. The court referred to provisions in the 1919 Constitution of the
German Reich and to former provisions of the Basic Law. Id. Its holding also
drew upon parliament's role in approving the budget, size, and organization of the
military as further evidence that control was intended by the constitution's
drafters. Kilimnik, supranote 85, at 128.
99.
Wiegandt, supra note 75, at 911-12.
100.
Kress, supra note 51, at 425. See also Wiegandt, supra note 75, at 912

(suggesting that disapproval of a proposed government deployment would be the
equivalent of a no-confidence vote and thus very unlikely to occur).
101.
102.
103.

Kommers, supranote 16, at 840.
Id. at 842.
Id. at 850.
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E. Analysis of Germany's Collective Security Agreements
The decision of the FCC was based in large part on its
interpretation of Article 24 and Germany's responsibilities within
its collective security agreements. Further analysis of potential
use of military forces under these agreements requires an
understanding of those responsibilities. Germany's three primary
collective security agreements are with the United Nations, NATO,
and the WEU.
1. U.N. Responsibilities Based on the U.N. Charter
With the end of the cold war, it is more likely that the United
Nations will take its intended place as the world's premier

collective security organization.1 0 4

In turn, Germany will be

called on more often to support U.N. security actions. Security
actions can take one of three forms: full-scale military action
against an aggressor nation in defense of a U.N. member country,
peacekeeping operations within a member country or along a
border, or a combination of active military operations in
connection with peacekeeping, sometimes called peacemaking.10 5
Military operations in response to aggression are explicitly
grounded in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.' 0 6
In order to
invoke the authority of Chapter VII, the U.N. Security Council
must first determine that actions by an aggressor nation
constitute a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or [an] act
of aggression." 0 7
Once such a determination is made, the
Security Council has the authority to "take such action by air,
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security."10 8 Article 42 of the U.N.

104. During more than forty years of cold war, the United Nations was
largely prevented from performing its collective security role because proposed
enforcement actions were continually vetoed by one of the five permanentmembers of the Security Council. From 1945 to 1990, two hundred and seventynine vetoes were cast in the Security Council. The lack of vetoes since 1990 bodes
well for future collective security actions. James E. Rossman, Article 43: Arming
the United Nations Security Council, 27 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 227, 231 (1994).
105. See Infra notes 106-122 and accompanying text.
106. John Sanderson, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking:
A Critical
Retrospective, 20 MELB. U.L. REV. 35, 37 (1995).

107.

U.N. CHARTER art. 39.

Article 39 provides In full:

"The Security

Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id.
108. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Article 42 provides in full:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such
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Charter is intended to provide a potent response to military
expansionism, and there have only been two clear examples of its
use: the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War. I 09
Peacekeeping operations have been more common, although

their U.N. Charter authority is questionable. I I0

There are

commentators who claim that, within the auspices of Chapter VI,
they represent an acceptable method for the "pacific settlement of
disputes" under Article 33.111
Others suggest they are an
unwritten innovation to a living U.N. Charter and thus represent

a "Chapter VI 1/2."112

Whatever their source of authority,

peacekeeping operations are not enforcement actions and do not
require the approval of the Security Council. 1 1 3

Because they do

not carry Chapter VII authority, peacekeeping operations require

the consent of the parties to the conflict, the involvement of
impartial peacekeepers, and restrictions against the use of force
except in self-defense. 1 4
These restrictions suggest that
peacekeepers would seldom be involved in combat activity."15 The
concept of self-defense, however, is loosely defined and has been
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.
Id. Article 41 allows the Security Council to consider various options not
involving the use of armed forces before resorting to armed action. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 41 (stating that the Security Council "may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed forces are to be employed").
109.
Sanderson, supra note 106, at 37.
110. Id.
111. Id. Article 33 provides in part:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek
a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
Judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their own choice.
U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1 (emphasis added).
112.
Ove Bring, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Prospective Issues for the
United Nations. 20 MEL. U.L. REv. 55, 56-57 (1995).
113.
The International Court of Justice has ruled that either the General
Assembly or the Security Council can authorize peacekeeping actions. Jon E.
Fink, From Peacekeeping to PeaceEnforcement- The Blurring of the Mandatefor the
Use of Force in Maintaining InternationalPeace and Security, 19 MD. J. INT'L L. &
TRADE 1, 13-14 (1995).
114.
Bring, supra note 112, at 56. Additional requirements that developed
over the years include: the operation must be under U.N. command, have the
backing of the international community, be multinational in composition, and
exclude troops from the five permanent Security Council members. Id.
115.
See Fink, supra note 113, at 14-15 (indicating that the use of force in
peacekeeping operations as officially limited to "proportionate and necessary" selfdefense thus distinguishing peacekeeping from troops in more aggressive
enforcement actions).
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6
modified to allow greater use of force in certain circumstances. 1
Until 1988, this type of action represented the primary type of
7
peacekeeping carried out by the United Nations. 1
A new type of peacekeeping operation, given teeth by a
Chapter VII enforcement mandate, appeared in Bosnia in 1992
and again in Somalia in 1993.118 These operations were different
from the Chapter VII actions of earlier years (the Korean and Gulf
Wars) as there were no aggressor nations.' 19 The actions were
entirely internal to those countries and were taken on
*humanitarian rather than defense grounds. While Article 2 of the
U.N. Charter specifically forbids "interven[tion] in matters which
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state," an
exception is made for the application of enforcement actions

under Chapter VII. 120

The Security Council has the authority to

determine what constitutes a "threat to peace" under Article
39,121 and it has recently adopted a "broader interpretation of
Article 39 ... [leading] to more liberal determinations of when a
humanitarian violation constitutes a threat to international peace
122
and security."
Given this broader interpretation of "threats to peace,"
peacemaking actions are likely to increase in the future. Internal
conflicts often have some type of transboundary impact, 12 3 and a
"growing body of human rights law" is likely to provide future
justification for armed intervention in internal conflicts with or
124
without the consent of the host nation.

116. Id. at 15.
117. Bring, supra note 112, at 59-60. Traditional functions included
actions such as the monitoring of cease-fires and the controlling of buffer zones.
Some actions were expanded to include peaceful involvement in the domestic
affairs of the host state such as organizing and supervising elections, monitoring

arms flow, monitoring human rights obligations, and assisting in the delivery of
humanitarian aid. In all cases, however, the actions were not based on an
enforcement mandate and required the consent of the host states. Id.
118. Id. at 60.
119.
In Bosnia, U.N. forces were deployed to protect safe zones in a civil war
between Bosnian Croats, Serbs, and Muslims. In Somalia, U.N. forces enforced
peace between rival Somalian warlords.
120.

U.N. CHARTER art. 2.

121.
Michelle Smith, Expanding Permanent Membership In the UN Security
Councib Opening a Pandora'sBox or Needed Change?, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 173,
176 (1993).
122.
Fink, supra note 113, at 7.
123.
Transboundary impacts of internal conflicts include: "mass migrations
of refugees, expanding armed conflicts when a domestic struggle 'spills' across the
border and problems with the availability and disruption of resources." Id. at 21.
124.
Id. at 45.
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Military forces to support all U.N. actions are requested from
member nations. 125 Article 43 was intended to enforce these
requests through a "special agreement or agreements" among the
members. 126 However, these agreements never materialized, and
127
Without such
Article 43 is considered a "dead letter."'
Council
Security
ignore
to
free
agreements, member nations are
at any
action
any
from
forces
requests for forces or withdraw their
28
powerful
militarily
and
economically
most
of
the
one
As
time.'
nations in the United Nations, Germany will continue to be
expected to support all three forms of collective security.
However, barring any future Article 43 agreement, the decision to
participate in any U.N. operation will remain at the discretion of
the German government.
2. Continuing Responsibilities under the North Atlantic Treaty
Germany's long history as a part of NATO 1 29 makes it likely
that this agreement will remain an important one in any German
NATO was originally
decision concerning the use of force.
130
the threat of attack
counter
to
treaty
organized as a defensive
13 1
With the
allies.
Pact
Warsaw
its
and
by the Soviet Union
ceased
essentially
has
threat
that
Pact,
dissolution of the Warsaw
132
still
leaders
NATO
change,
fundamental
this
Despite
to exist.

believe that the Alliance is a critical institution for the security of
125. James W. Houck, The Commander In Chief and the United Nations
CharterArticle 43: A Case of IrreconcilableDifferences?. 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-9

(1993).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
Houck. supra note 125, at 3-4.
Id. at 8-9.
See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
The primary operative part of the treaty, Article 5. provides in part:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all;
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of
the North Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, art. 5. 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
Colin Mclnnes, The Future of NATO, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN
131.
SEcuRrry 85, 86 (Christoph Bluth et al. eds., 1995).
"The military function of the [Warsaw Pact] had been virtually defunct
132.
since the events at the Berlin Wall and the Kremlin officially terminated the
Warsaw Pact military structure during April 1991." Jeffrey S. Palmer, The New
European Order: Restructuring the Security Regime under the Conference on
Security and CooperationIn Europe, 5 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 51, 54 (1991).
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Europe and that it must adapt to the changing international
environment. 133 At a 1991 NATO conference in Rome, Alliance
leaders announced a new strategic plan outlining these
fundamental changes. The plan declared that NATO no longer
had any known enemies, that future threats to peace were likely
to be a result of instability rather than aggression, and that NATO
1 34
forces were being reorganized to meet the new threat scenario.
In sum, "NATO is transitioning to become a broader alliance of
135
collective security as opposed to purely a defensive alliance."'
For the present, at least, it appears that NATO will continue
to be a viable collective security arrangement. In the short term,
NATO will be necessary for "managing the residue of the East
West conflict and the stabilization of Eastern Europe." 136 These
are activities more consistent with its original defensive mandate.
Over the long term, the survival of NATO depends on an
innovative force structure called the Allied Command Europe
Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). 137 The ARRC was created by NATO
to "meet the sort of risks and challenges which are considered
more likely to emerge in the future." 138 It is extremely flexible
and designed to engage in operations ranging from peacekeeping
and humanitarian efforts to high intensity conflict, giving NATO
the capability to meet the full spectrum of collective security
139
contingencies.
Use of the ARRC to meet threats to NATO member security is
clearly within the NATO mandate. The potential also exists for
the use of the ARRC as NATO's method of responding to security
threats on the NATO periphery, such as the Balkans and the
Middle East. 140 The NATO treaty neither requires nor excludes
operations outside of the NATO area, but Article 4 provides the
basis for member nations to consult about such security

133.
Mclnnes, supranote 131, at 85.
134. John Harwood & Mark M. Nelson, Bush Is Assured Europe Wants U.S.
In NATO, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1991, at A16.
135.
Settlement Treaty Hearings, supra note 58, at 10 (statement of Major
General John 0. B. Sewall, Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5),

Joint Staff!).
136.
Phil Williams, CFE and the Future of NATO, In THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN
SECURITY 133, 141 (J. Philip Rogers ed., 1993).
137.
Mclnnes, supra note 131, at 93. The ARRC consists of a Corps
headquarters under British command which will eventually have access to eight
to ten divisions of varying forms (including:
armored, airborne, airmobile,
mechanized infantry, and mountain infantry) composed of nearly all NATO
nationalities. The ARRC is intended to be extremely flexible in terms of size and
force composition making it capable of meeting a vide spectrum of conflict
situations. Id. at 96-97.
138. Id. at 87.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 98.
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threats. 14 1 In the past, NATO has never acted collectively in
response to out-of-area contingencies, mostly due to the
objections of the French. 14 2 Recently, however, the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe has argued that NATO should adopt a
greater out-of-area role. 143 While the inter-alliance debate on the
issue has not been resolved, NATO has agreed formally to out-of144
area peacekeeping operations.
NATO is transforming from a purely defensive relationship to
a more standard collective security arrangement. 14 5 NATO forces
will be used to meet the full spectrum of security contingencies
within the NATO area and at least perform peacekeeping missions
out-of-area. NATO will also eventually assume a more active outof-area role either on its own or within the auspices of the United
Nations. 1 4 6
While some commentators suggest that an all14 7
NATO
European security arrangement should replace NATO,
148
members appear to be committed to the alliance.
Even the
former Soviet Union has accepted NATO as a stabilizing force on
the continent. 1 4 9 As a key member of NATO, 150 Germany will
increasingly be called on to support collective security actions
15 1
both within and outside the NATO area.

141.
Jane Stromseth, Structuring a New Security Regime in Europe. 85 AM.
SOCY INT'L L. PRoc. 277, 283 (1991).
142. Williams, supra note 136, at 139. The French prefer an all-European
organization take such actions and the WEU has been used to fill the void. Id.
143. Stromseth, supranote 141, at 283.
144. Mclnnes, supranote 131, at 98-99.

145.

See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.

146.
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter permits the Security Council to use
regional security organizations such as NATO to perform regional or international
conflict management under Security Council control. Fink, supra note 113, at 8.
147. See Palmer, supra note 132, at 59 (arguing that a Euro-security
organization may be better equipped to mediate regional conflicts than a U.S.dominated NATO).
148.
At the 1991 NATO conference in Rome, former President George Bush
asked whether Europe was ready to forgo NATO in favor of an all-European
security solution.
In response, "[E]ach of the other 15 leaders personally
endorsed a statement ... calling NATO the leading force in Western security."
Harward & Nelson, supra note 134, at A16. German Chancellor Kohl "called a
united Europe without NATO 'unthinkable.'" Id.
149. Williams, supra note 136, at 140.
150.
Germany is viewed as a "pivotal" member of NATO because of its
resources and its geographic position in central Europe. Ingo Peters, Neither a
Pawn nor a Superpower: A New Security Arrangementfor Germany in Europe, in
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 58, 65 (J. Philip Rogers ed., 1993)
151.
German Air Force officers were key members of the AWACS crews
enforcing the no-fly ban over the former Yugoslavia. Security Council Decision on
Bosnia Puts Pressureon Germany to Resolve Issue of the Role of the Military, WEEK
IN GERMANY HIGH TECH, April 2, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2497771. A German
armored division is committed to the ARRC and can be called on in a contingency
situation. Mclnnes, supra note 131, at 96.
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3. Pan-European Security and the Western European Union
The WEU was formed in 1948 as an alliance among the West
European victors of World War II "to afford assistance to each
other... in maintaining international peace and security and in
resisting any policy of aggression." 15 2 Even though a founding
purpose was "[tlo take such steps as may be held to be necessary
53
in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression,"1
the FRG was admitted to the WEU in 1954.154 For the next thirty
years, the WEU existed in relative obscurity in the shadow of
NATO.' 5 5 In 1984, however, the WEU was revived with the idea
that it could be used to coordinate security policy for the
European Community (EC. 1 5 6 Since then, it has been used to
coordinate certain military activities such as the European forces
involved in the Gulf War. i5 7 European forces, including German
forces, have even been established outside the auspices of NATO
58
and made available for use by the WEU.1
France openly opposes a European defense policy set by
NATO, which it sees as dominated by the United States, and
instead advocates the WEU as an EC defense force controlled by
European will. 159
While most other European countries are
unwilling to take the concept that far, there is support among
British, German, and Italian officials for use of the WEU for out160
of-area operations, rather than extending the NATO mandate.
The idea may be well intentioned, but it does not look promising
given that EC countries remain free to define security issues in
their own self-interest. 16 1 Divergent security policies in the Gulf

152. Treaty Between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, March 17, 1948, 19
U.N.T.S. 51, 53.
153. Id.
154. Palmer, supra note 132, at 63 n.90.
155. See (d. at 63-66.
156. Donna G. Starr, An Analysis of European Political Cooperation During
the PersianGulf Crisis, 10 DICK. J. INT'L L. J. 443, 452 (1992).

157.

Palmer, supra note 132, at 63-64.

158. The "Eurocorps" is based in Strasbourg and consists of "an integrated
force of 50,000 French, German, Belgian and Spanish troops presently under
German command." In addition, two new forces consisting of Italian, Spanish,

French, and Portuguese troops have been set up to protect Europe's
Mediterranean flank. Tyler Marshall, Europe Dffers on Organizing Unfled Forces,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 29, 1995, at Al.

Although the Eurocorps can be

used to support NATO, its founding agreement makes it clear that its "foremost"
role is to support the WEU. Qu'est-ce qu'onfalt? Ich weiss nicht, ECONOMIST, May
23, 1992, at 51.
159. Palmer, supra note 132, at 65. Note that France Is not a member of
the military segment of NATO. Id.
160. Stromseth. supra note 141, at 283.
161. Starr, supranote 156, at 446.
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War were a clear example of a lack of common resolve among the
cannot agree on a
European states. 162 Even now, WEU members
16 3
common policy for military force structure.
A lack of leadership is not the only factor preventing the WEU
from becoming Europe's premier security arrangement. Declining
military budgets make a totally separate force unrealistic. 16 4 As a
result, any EC military force will be dependent on NATO
equipment and expertise for the foreseeable future. 165 In contrast
to NATO, the WEU will remain a minor actor in terms of collective
security actions. Nevertheless, the WEU may take action where
there is a commonality of interest among all the members,
especially if the resulting operation is small. Therefore, Germany
will have to consider the possibility of WEU action when planning
for the use of military force.

III. SOCIOPOLITICAL FACTORS BEARING ON THE GERMAN USE OF
MILITARY FORCE

A country may be legally entitled to use military force, but
the use of force is always tempered by social and political forces
both from within and outside the country. This section analyzes

162.

Jeffrey Palmer asks the crucial question: "If the EC cannot unify its

current members on policy questions, which they agree upon in principle, (here,
the condemnation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait). how will it successfully
coordinate a political body to encompass the entire European continent?"
Palmer, supra note 132, at 63.
163.
Some countries, like Germany, want a "centrally organized and highly
integrated European military force," while Great Britain insists that its military
forces will only operate under its national control. Marshall, supra note 158, at
Al. Internal disagreements among WEU members may severely hamper the
organization's effectiveness as a collective security arrangement for some time.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that only a NATO led by a strong
U.S. presence can focus European security interests. See Hans-Peter Schwarz,
Germany's National and EuropeanInterests: A Country Without NationalInterests?.
DAEDALUS, Spring 1994, at 81, 88. Schwarz suggests two major arguments
against the WEU taking NATO's place. The first is that U.S. presence in Europe
has been a major factor in maintaining stability and democracy. The second is
that the United States is effective at balancing interests which would otherwise
have European countries divided and continuously maneuvering for position. Id.
at 96. The WEU troubles in the Gulf War appear to have postponed its
establishment as a full-scale Europe-only defense system. Starr, supra note 156,
at 452. Many have accepted what Jonathan Eyal, director of studies at the Royal
United Services Institute, has stated, "[tihe reality is that Europe cannot mount a
large military operation on its own without American support." Marshall, supra
note 158, at Al.
164.
It has been estimated that the cost to create an independent European
military force (outside of NATO) would be over $100 billion annually for the next
ten years. Id.
165.
Harwood & Nelson, supranote 134, at A16.
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the attitudes on the use of force within the German government
and among the German people, as well as German international
goals that might require a change in those attitudes. In addition,
it reviews the international political climate from the perspective
of those countries who would be most interested in a decision to
expand the use of force: the United States, Russia, and the other
major powers in Europe.
A. Internal FactorsBearing on the Expanded Use of Force
The FCC decision is only the first step toward expanded use
of German military force.
While the court ruled that the
constitution does not forbid the out-of-area deployment of
German forces, it also made it clear that the actual decision to
commit troops in any particular situation belongs to the German
Parliament and ultimately the German people. 166 The attitudes
and the trends within the German government and among the
populace in general influence the path German policy will follow.
1. Conflicts Within the German Parliament
The FCC decision, as a matter of German law, did not resolve
what continues to be a divisive political issue. From the time the
Basic Law was adopted until relatively recently, the German

government regularly proclaimed that it was forbidden to use
armed forces for any reason other than the defense of NATO
territory. 1 67 Ironically, it was this hard-line stance against the
use of military forces in the Gulf War that resulted in the gradual
policy changes that followed. 168 Shortly after the war ended, the

166.
Mark M. Nelson, Berlin Loses American Guard, WALL ST. J. EUROPE,
July 13, 1994, at 1.
167.
This was the clear position taken as Allied forces began to gather for
the war against Iraq. The German government was quick to take political
measures against Iraq. It condemned the Iraqi invasion, froze the assets of both
Iraq and Kuwait, and lent its support to international economic sanctions. Marc
Fisher. European Gropefor Unified Response Toward Persian Guif Threat Bonn,
Leery of Larger Role, Considers Joining Task Force, WASH. POST, August 15. 1990,
at A18. However, as Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg made clear, "no
German forces could take part in the international effort because of the
constitutional restrictions against military involvement outside of the NATO area."

Id.
168. Fisher, supra note 5, at A27. The resulting Allied backlash led to "a
growing awareness that any repeat of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where Germany
sat at home alone while the rest of Western Europe went to fight, would be
disastrous for the country." Marshall, supra note 158, at Al. In a later interview,
Karl Lamers, a German foreign policy specialist and legislator, said, "'We've got to
accept our responsibility .....
[olur ability to keep our freedom, our prosperity

depends far more on the Germans than we realize'." Id.
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German government began to send
limited numbers of military
16 9
forces outside of the NATO area.
The actions touched off a political debate that highlighted
strong divisions in the government. The opposition party, the
SPD, took the position that "German troops must never be
permitted to join international combat missions. 170 Opposition
by the SPD and the Green party continued when the German
government sent military engineers to support the U.N. mission in
Somalia and allowed German air crew members to fly on Airborn
Warning and Control System (AWACS)
aircraft performing
171
surveillance of the former Yugoslavia.
The attitude against out-of-area use of force showed some

signs of changing, however, in the debate over German support

for the U.N. mission in Bosnia. 17 2

Government support for a

169. Germany sent troops to take part in the humanitarian effort to help
the Kurds in Iraq, even though the mission took place outside of NATO territory.
Fisher, supra note 5. at A27. In 1992, naval forces were committed to operations
off the Yugoslav coast "as a way to broaden the reach of German military forces
beyond strict limits observed for decades by West German governments." Marc
Fisher, Deployment of Destroyer Sets Off Storm in Bonn, WASH. POST, July 16,
1992, at A18. The German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, inferred that the action
was taken partially to reduce pressure from the western allies stemming from
Germany's refusal to participate militarily in the Gulf War. He suggested that it
was time for Germany to "drop its 'shirker' role and quit behaving like 'an
impotent dwarf in international organizations." Id.
170. Rick Atkinson, New 'Grand Coalition' Less Likely in Germany; Social
Democrats Still Targeting Kohl, WASH. POST, August 25, 1993, at A16. "The policy
declaration represented a victory for the party's pacifist faction and seemed to
scuttle chances for a compromise with Kohl's government regarding the role of
Germany's military." Id. The SPD leader clearly announced the basic point of
contention: "The conflict we have in Germany... is about whether our armed
forces can be deployed for wars that have nothing to do with the defense of our
country." Id. The party adopted the position that German military forces could
only be used for the defense of NATO. Many of the party members subscribed to
the theory that the constitution forbade German involvement in combat abroad.
The ruling party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), took the opposite position
saying that, "'our position is clear and precise: the German army can be deployed
in U.N. missions'." Id.
171. Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.
172. In late 1994, the CDU argued that Germany had a responsibility to
support U.N. and NATO operations in Bosnia. In a speech to the German
Parliament, Defense Minister Volker Ruehe said, "'[wihen it is a question of
providing protection for Frenchman, Britons and Americans who have done so
much for our freedom, without whom we would never have achieved German
unity in freedom, anyone who refuses this is taking an axe to the alliance'."
Ramesh Jaura, Germany-Bosna: Opposition Mounts to Military Involvement, Inter
Press Service, Dec. 23, 1994, available in 1994 WL 8688061.
Opponents saw the action as simply bowing to the will of NATO. A member of
the Green party even suggested that the chief of the German armed forces had
conspired with NATO leaders to persuade them to ask for the German forces. Id.
Many members of the SPD,however, switched sides and agreed to some type
of military support. Guenter Verheugen, general secretary of the SPD, said that it
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combat role in Bosnia increased in early 1995, culminating in a
Parliament vote to commit up to 1,700 troops to support the U.N.
mission. 17 3 Despite the fact that the coalition government holds
only a ten seat margin in the Parliament, the vote in favor of the
deployment was 386 to 258.174 Included in the solid majority
were several dozen members of both the SPD and the Green party
who ignored their party's pacifist traditions. 175 In December of
1995, when another vote was taken to commit additional troops,
the margin was even wider with 543 voting
in favor of the
76
deployment and only 107 against deployment. 1
Despite this obvious change in attitude, the German
Parliament is still a long way from endorsing the unrestricted use
of military force. Restrictions on the activities of the forces
deployed in Bosnia show that these first steps are tentative. 17 7 In
addition, the government continues to reduce the size of the
German military, calling into question its commitment to any
significant use of forces in the future. 178 Reductions in both the
had become "self-evident that Germany has to be ready to assist the U.N. in [the]
former Yugoslavia." Id. While the complete reason for the change in position is
not clear, some have suggested that SPD members were convinced to support the
measure by "more than four years of intense media coverage of the ongoing
slaughter in [the] former Yugoslavia." Erik Kirschbaum, Reluctant Germany Votes
to Send 4,000 Troops to Balkans, WASH. TIMES. Dec. 8, 1995, at A14.
173. Mary Williams Walsh, Edging Toward Combat, Germans Boost Bosnia
Role, L.A. TIMEs, July 1, 1995, at 1.
174. Id. The German military commitment was substantial, Including
medics and logistics troops, transport planes, and Tornado bombers for
reconnaissance and surface to air missile defense. Most of the German forces are
restricted to supporting a rapid reaction force of British, French, and Dutch
troops. Id. at 8.
175. Germany Takes Bosnia Role, supra note 13, at A34. One commentator
called the action of several Green party leaders in voting for the deployment
"startling evidence of a... change in German attitudes." Atkinson, supra note 8,
at A15. Helmut Lippelt, a Green party member who voted for the deployment
said, "Itihe United Nations [mission] can only function if it's protected militarily."
Jaura, supra note 172. Another commentator pointed out that "[tihe success of
Chancellor Kohl... in organizing a 128-seat margin for [the] vote shows how far
German public opinion has come in the five years since German unification." Id.
176. Marsha Van De Berg, Germany Is Astride Europe Again - With a
Difference, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 29, 1995, at B5. The ruling party was joined in
the vote by many leaders of the SPD and even the pacifist Green party. Id.

177.

The combat aircraft are restricted to flying In support of the British-

French-Dutch Rapid Reaction Force. They cannot enforce the U.N. no-fly zone or
protect the U.N. safe areas. A German general in the NATO command center is
responsible for ensuring that all the German Air Force assignments comply with
the restrictions placed on them by Parliament. Atkinson, supra note 8, at A15.
Despite these rigid restrictions, some of the members of the SPD are already
accusing the German Air Force of exceeding parliamentary authority by flying
unauthorized missions. Id.
178. As late as 1990, West German forces alone numbered over 500,000.
Marc Fisher, Kohl Plans Cut in German Forces; Military May Shrink 40 Percent to
Buttress Faltering Economy, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993, at A26. In the Two Plus
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size of forces and military budgets17 9have also resulted in lower
morale within the German military.
Despite all these factors, however, the ruling coalition has
been able to slowly steer German policy away from a forty-year
pacifist tradition, and has taken the first steps toward the use of
military force as a tool of foreign policy. Along the way, it has
gained support from members of the opposition and has
established a trend for continued acceptance of a German role in
NATO and U.N. military missions.
2. The Will of the German People
After the carnage of World War II, it is not surprising that the
German people would shun the use of force.
When early

discussions of rearmament were held in late 1949, a large
majority of the German people opposed it. 1 80

Fifty years later,

this attitude still exists and recently appeared to be growing
Four Treaty, Germany committed to reducing its forces to 370,000 within three to
four years after reunification. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 55, art. 3.

Despite the fact that this commitment is not binding under international law, it is
politically binding on the government of the newly united Germany and is fully
intended to be met. Settlement Treaty Hearings. supra note 58, at 18 (statement
of Hon. James F. Dobbins, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs). In fact, the total manning of the German armed
forces is expected to be down to 300,000 troops by the end of 1996 and there
have been some reports that the government intends to reduce the final number
to around 200,000. Fisher, at A26. However, even with the reductions, Germany
still has the largest military in the European Union. Walsh, supra note 4, at Bl.
A military of reduced size may not be as much of a handicap given the general
reduction of forces in Europe. Schmidt, supra note 63, at 29. One French
defense official has suggested that Germany will be Europe's strongest military
power in five years. Joseph Fitchett, Germany Moves to Shoulder Europe's Post2000 Military Burden, INT'L HERALD TRiB., Dec. 7, 1995, at 1.
179. In 1993, the budget was cut by nearly $600 million and plans for new
armament programs were frozen. Fisher, supra note 178, at A26. In a report,
Parliament found that the German military was not ready to support deployment
for active operations. The report,found that the lack of readiness was a result of
budget cuts, integration of East German units, and large changes in force
structure and planning. The report also found that German forces suffer from a
severe crisis of morale brought on by the drastic cuts in defense spending and the
lack of a clear political policy. Quentin Peel & Reuter, Warning on GermanForces:
Bundeswehr not ready for active operations, says report, FiN. TIMEs, March 24,
1993, at 3. However, it is also expected that the reduced force structure may
result in the elimination of the draft and a move to an all professional military.
Fisher. supra note 178, at A26. This would likely result in a higher quality,
although smaller, force and would probably eliminate some of the current morale
problems.
180. McGEEHAN, supra note 34, at 68. The New York Times reported, "The
French aversion to arming the Germans appears to be matched only by the
German aversion to being rearmed." Id. For a good description of many of the
reasons why most Germans were against rearmament see Large, supra note 2. at
45-47.
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stronger. 1 8 ' During the Gulf War when the attack on Iraq began,
thousands of Germans denounced it in the streets. 18 2 Although
support for Allied action increased as the war went on,' 8 3 the vast
majority of Germans opposed any direct involvement by the
German military.' 8 4 Although there was some support for the
U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, 185 overall there Is little
186
popular support for any use of military force.
If public opinion continues in this general vein, it is unlikely
that the German government will be able to expand the use of

military force even with the blessings of the Parliament and the

FCC. The current action in Bosnia is likely to be a watershed in
this regard.
From early on, public opinion was against any
German military involvement in the former Yugoslavia, and this

attitude did not change significantly over time.' 8 7

Nevertheless,

181. Fisher, supra note 178, at A26. Opinion polls are showing reduced
support for use of military forces. In the early 1980s, three quarters of West
Germans supported the need for armed forces, while polls today show that less
than half continue to support that need. Id. With the demise of the Soviet Union,
many Germans no longer see a justification for the Bundeswehr and believe the
money could be better spent on the cost of reunification. Qu'est-ce quonfalt? Ich
weiss nicht, supra note 158, at 53. The feeling is strong not only among those
who remember World War H but among the younger generation as well. This is
born out by "the fact that each year almost as many German 18-year-olds declare
themselves to be conscientious objectors and opt for alternative, and longer,
civilian service as actually report for duty as draftee soldiers in the Bundeswehr."
Domberg, supra note 2, at DI1.
182. Timothy Aeppel, Outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Bonn Says Unified
Germany Doesn't Pose a Threat, WALL. ST. J. (Europe), Aug. 16, 1991, at 2.
183. Initially, only about half the German public thought the war was
justified. Following a visit by the German Foreign Minister to war-damaged
Jerusalem. support for the allied action firmed up and reached 66% In the
opinion polls. Christopher Knowlton & Carla Rapoport, Germany & Japan:
Missing InAction, FORTUNE, March 11, 1991, at 57, 58.
184. Although one poll eventually showed 80% of Germans supporting the
coalition attack, three-fourths of the same people opposed any direct involvement
by the German military. John Templeman, It's Timefor Germany to Stop Sitting on
its Hands, Bus. WEEK, February 4, 1991, at 67.
185. A poll by the German military showed an 80% public acceptance of the
military's efforts in Somalia. Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.
186. Marshall, supra note 158, at Al. In addition, a commentator suggests
that "[tlhe gradual disintegration of the centrist Free Democrats and the prospect
that the environmentalist Greens might emerge as the new holders of the balance
of national power will only enhance this reluctance." Id.
187. In 1992, a poll reported in a Munich newspaper showed 65% of those
surveyed were against any German participation in a joint European effort to
enforce a cease fire and 54% were opposed to any military actions outside of
NATO territory. Fisher. supra note 167, at A18. In 1993, another survey showed
64% against any German military action to end the civil war in Yugoslavia and
53% expressed German forces should only be used in defense of Germany or
NATO territory. Dornberg, supra note 2, at D11. Finally, as late as December of
1994, a survey showed 63% of those interviewed to be categorically against the
deployment of German forces in Bosnia. Jaura, supranote 172.
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since Germany has committed to U.N. peacekeeping operations,
the potential exists for a change in attitude. 8 8 If the German
public comes to accept the idea of forces in Bosnia, it could result
in greater public support for future government attempts to use
military forces in support of security actions.

3. Germany's Future Goals in the International Community
The united Germany has the largest population in the
European community, dominates central Europe geographically,
and has one of the largest and strongest economies in the
world. 18 9 One would expect such a country to play a major role in
international politics, but that has not been the case. The late
West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, once described his
country as "an economic giant but a political dwarf."' 9 0 German
inaction in the Gulf War was a perfect example of this attitude.
During that war, "Germany came under sharp criticism [from
other countries] for not living up to the military responsibilities of
a country of its stature, stability and economic clout."19 1 Even
German commentators argued that military inaction was
incompatible with the united Germany's desired stature in the
92
world. 1
It now appears that the Gulf War embarrassment may have
been the turning point for Germany's understanding of what
responsibilities a nation must accept to be a major world
power. 19 3 In September of 1993, Germany offered itself for a
permanent position on an expanded U.N. Security Council. 19 4 At
that time, Germany's reluctance to provide military forces to

188. Johann G. Dora, the commander of the Luftwaffe forces serving in
Bosnia, suggests that "Ithe feeling in German society toward the military has
changed, and it has also changed in the Parliament. There's a much broader

support for this kind of mission." Atkinson, supra note 8,at A15.
189. The united Germany has a population of 80.3 million compared to
57.6 million in Italy. 57.5 million in Great Britain, and 56.6 million in France. In
1992, Germany exported goods worth $429 billion compared to $235 billion for
France, $190 billion for Great Britain, and $180 billion for Italy. Schwarz, supra

note 163, at 84.
190. Van De Berg, supra note 176, at B5.
191. Walsh, supranote 4,at 1.
192. Josef Joffe. foreign editor of a Munich daily paper wrote, "Bonn cannot
always let others do the dirty work.... In the long run, it cannot be good for the
Germans, either, when dictators start playing with oil-the lifeline of the world
economy-and the A-bomb." Fisher, supra note 167, at A18. The National
newspaper Die Welt commented, "[S]overeignty is not compatible with halfneutralism in a conflict started by an aggressor in a crucial part of the world...
[wie must be in a position to act." Id.
193. Knowlton & Rapoport, supra note 183, at 58.
194. Ian Davidson, Germany Seeks to Join Enlarged Security Council, FIN.
TIMES, September 30, 1993, at 4.
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support U.N. peacekeeping operations was seen by many
1 95
commentators as a major impediment to securing a position.
As a result, German Chancellor Kohl began to promote a greater

international role for Germany's military, especially after the FCC
19 6
removed the perceived constitutional barrier.

The Parliamentary vote authorizing the use of combat forces

to support the U.N. operations in Bosnia was a major victory for
Kohl, and a big step toward a major international role for
Germany. 197 Nevertheless, Germany will be pressured to support
other U.N. efforts, and will have to expand its military role if it
hopes to garner a Security Council position and the international
leadership that comes with it.
B. InternationalFactorsBearing on the Use of Force
Given the history of German military aggression and the
resulting wariness of most countries, it is unlikely that Germany
will expand its military activities without considering
international opinion. Economically, Germany is considered a
world leader, and it will not take any action that might jeopardize
The United States, Russia, and Germany's
that position.
neighbors in Europe are likely to have the greatest effect on any
decision to use force.
The United States has the most positive view of a militarily
active Germany. Upon hearing the decision of the FCC, President
Clinton stated that he was "completely comfortable" with the
reduced restraints on German military use. 19 8 The United States
is also eager to have Germany shoulder a larger part of the cost
for worldwide security. 199 Nevertheless, trust in Germany is not
yet absolute. The primary reason for insisting that the newly
reunited Germany remain in NATO was to ensure that the United
20 0
States could still exert some control over its security policy.
to have
With this one caveat, the United States is fully prepared
20
Germany participate in military operations abroad. '
195.
196.

Id.
Paul Richter & Marjorie Miller, Germany Urged to Take Broader Role,

Clinton Asks Country to Share Costs and Burdens of Leading Europe, DES. MOINES
REG., July 12, 1994. at 7.

197.

Germany Takes BosniaRole, supra note 13, at A34.

198.

Nelson, supra note 166, at 1. The United States has a close bilateral

relationship with Germany and appreciates Germany's "preference for balanced,
transatlantic solutions to European security problems." Geipel, supra note 12, at

A5.
199. Richter & Miller, supra note 196, at 7.
200. Gustav Schmidt, Happy Moments: Solving the Special German-Soviet
Russian Conflict, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 437, 444 (1991).
201. Michael Anders, GermanRuling Lets Troops Go Abroad, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
July 13, 1994, at 34.
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At the other extreme is Russia which has only recently, and
very slowly, begun warming to the idea of the reemergence of
German arms. Russia and Germany were enemies for most of
this century and many Russians still have strong memories of
German actions in World War 11.202 As late as 1988, the Soviet
Union insisted that a divided Germany, with East Germany
serving as a buffer country, was integral to Soviet security
interests. 20 3 When the Soviet Union did accept the idea of
reunification, it would only do so under the condition20 4that
Germany be "demilitarized" and adopt a policy of neutrality.
The West German government went to great lengths to ease
Soviet fears to win their approval for reunification and the right to
remain in the NATO alliance. The Germans agreed to reevaluate
the NATO view of the Soviet threat, 20 5 an effort which eventually
led to the changes in NATO strategy outlined by the Rome
The Germans also assured Moscow that the
Declaration. 20 6
Soviets would be invited to be part of a pan-European security
arrangement giving the Soviet Union a voice in the future of
European security.2 0 7 Finally, Germany agreed to a significant

list of military and economic concessions. 20 8

Under these

conditions, the Soviet Union finally agreed to reunification,
and
Germany,
NATO for the united
in
membership
relinquishment of its remaining World War II rights to control the
German military. 20 9 Even with all of these concessions, it is likely
that the former Soviet Union will monitor any significant use of
German force, especially in areas where the Russians have
security interests.

Rick Atkinson & Fred Hiatt, Twin Giants Sway Europe's Fate: Russia202.
Germany Equilibrium Crucialto Continent, WASH. POST, November 26, 1995, at Al,
A30.
203. Schmidt, supra note 200, at 441.
204. Valentin Falin, Let Germany Abjure Force, Then Map its Own Future
Germany, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1990, at B7. The extent of the desired neutrality is
not clear, although included in the Soviet Union's demand was a requirement that
"Germany would be obliged not to use force or the threat of force to resolve
conflicts of interest or pursue any objective." Id. (emphasis added). See also
Schmidt, supra note 200, at 442. To the Soviet Union, the U.S. demand that the
united Germany remain a part of NATO was a continuation of Cold War
confrontationalism. Falin, supra at B7.
205. Schmidt, supra note 200, at 444.
206. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
207. Schmidt, supra note 200, at 442.
208. Germany agreed to the following concessions: (1) NATO forces will not
be deployed on the territory of the former East Germany; (2) the United States will
reduce the size of its military presence in Germany; (3) limits will be placed on the

overall size of the German military; (4) there will be no nuclear veapons ever
stationed on former East German soil; and (5) Germany made major economic

contributions to the modernization of the Soviet economy. Id. at 451-52.
209. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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The attitudes of the other countries in Europe tend to fall
somewhere between these two extremes. Initially, history made it
very difficult for other Western European powers to accept a
Germany with military forces under sovereign control. 210 Eastern
European countries also had reason to be concerned. 2 11 Even the
Poles, while welcoming the prospect of German participation in
multilateral military operations,
suggested that German
participation "will have to be prepared with more care than
2 12

usual."

Events since reunification have done much to ease the fears
of other European countries. First, the reunified Germany has
remained a part of NATO and therefore quelled some of the fears
of what course a "neutral," but armed, Germany might take
without NATO restraint. 2 13
Germany has worked hard to
continue to associate itself with NATO interests and thus "anchor

[itself] ever deeper in the West. ' 2 14

In addition, Germany

amended Article 23 of the Basic Law to commit itself to 2the
15

development of the European Union and its common interests.
On the military side, Germany is using joint operations to
convince other European countries of its sincerity.2 1 6 Finally,
Germany has received significant help from the United
States
2 17

which remains a stout advocate of a greater German role.

210.
"The French, Belgians and British have long memories of German
juggernauts over two centuries." Hobart Rowen, Japan and Germany Must Take
Bigger Military, Policy Making Roles In World Affairs, WASH. POST, March 3, 1991,
at H1, H14. As French analyst Phillippe Moreau Defarges put it,"there is this
fear that the old devils can always come back" Nelson, supranote 166, at 1.
211.
As Dieter Dettke, executive director of the German Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, explains it,"From the perspective of a small eastern European
country, even a Bundeswehr which has been reduced to 370.000 soldiers is large.
... modem and well-equipped and sits on their doorstep." Van De Berg, supra
note 176, at B5.
212.
Nelson, supra note 166, at 1 (quoting Andrzej Karkoszka, director of
the Department of Strategic Studies and the Polish Defense Ministry).
213.
Quint, supra note 57, at 606.
214.
Van De Berg, supra note 176, at B5.
215.
Schwarz, supra note 163, at 84. Schwarz suggests that "Ibjy this step
the virtual equation of German and European interests ... was anchored in the
constitution." Id. at 85.
216. The Franco-German Corps was intended to cement a "special

relationship" between Germany and France. Qu'est-ce qu'onfalt? Ich weiss nlcht,

supra note 158, at 51; See also Fitchett, supra note 178, at 1 (German Chancellor
made a personal inspection of a Dutch-German military force to allay Dutch
fears.).
217.
Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.
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IV. SPECTRUM OF POTENTIAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND GERMANY'S
SOVEREIGN USE OF FORCE

Now that Germany has full sovereign rights over its military,
its options for the use of force represent a spectrum ranging from
a policy of virtual neutrality, where German forces are only used

in self-defense or perhaps in direct defense of NATO territory, to a
policy of aggression based on national objectives reminiscent of
the first half of the century. Neither of these extremes is the
likely final outcome. External pressure and a desire to take a
position of economic and political leadership in the post Cold War
world will prevent Germany from completely shirking military
responsibility. National and international legal restrictions and
the watchful eye of a wary international community, however, will

prevent the type of aggressive militarism that sparked two world
wars. In between these two extremes lies a wide range of options
including use of force for peacekeeping, peacemaking in a
multilateral context, and unilateral military action for the same

purposes. This section analyzes this spectrum of potential use of
force and relies on the factors identified in the first part of this
Note to suggest the most likely path German military policy will
take.
A. Self-Defense and a Policy of Limited Use of Force
One potential direction for German policy would be a retreat

to use of force only in self-defense.

Some Germans oppose any

type of military involvement based on "historical, moral,
constitutional, and budgetary grounds."2 18 In theory, Article 24
of the Basic Law, which allows Germany to transfer sovereign
powers to collective security organizations, requires that the
mandates of those organizations be met.2 19 The U.N. Charter,
however, does not require support for U.N. military operations,
and both NATO and the WEU only require action when one of the
Germany is not obliged to provide
members is attacked. 2 20
military forces for any other reason than the direct defense of
NATO or WEU territory.
Some of the smaller parties in the German Parliament do not
Some
support the use of force except in self-defense. 2 2 1
Schwarz, supra note 163, at 102.
218.
GG. supra note 3, art. 24.
219.
220. See supra notes 128, 130 and 152 and accompanying text.
Both the Green party and the reform Communist Party of Democratic
221.
Socialism opposed the government's recent efforts to send forces to Bosnia.
Kirschbaum, supra note 172, at A14. The fundamentalist wing of the Green party
calls for neutrality and the dissolution of all military alliances. Crawford and
Halfmann, supra note 48, at 223.
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commentators have suggested that an alliance formed between
the SPD and these smaller parties might drive Germany toward a
policy of neutrality. 2 22 Such a possibility seems to have taken on
new life now that the SPD has elected a new leader. 223 The new
head of the SPD is a pacifist, and many of his other political views
accord with the German left wing.2 24 These factors increase the
possibility of an alliance between the SPD and these smaller
parties.
Despite these changes, the chance of Germany returning to
an isolationist military policy is remote. The current coalition
government supports membership in NATO and a multilateralist
policy.2 25 Other members of NATO expect Germany to support
military collective security actions in the Middle East and Eastern
Europe. 2 26 In the end, Germany will not realize its international
2 27
political goals without using military force where appropriate.
These very pragmatic reasons account for the fact that "German
neutrality... is not a political option contemplated by any of the
major political forces in Germany"2 28 and the fact that less than
one-third of the German population supports a policy of
neutrality. 22 9 At least for now, "Germany [is] moving with . . .
slightly surprising speed to shed inhibitions about the use of
- 2 30
force.
B. Military Action within a Collective Security Agreement

Germany's actions in Somalia and Bosnia represent the first
steps toward the external projection of force within a multilateral

collective security agreement. After the 1994 FCC decision, there
is no legal impediment to continuing these types of operations.
According to the FCC and constitutional authority in Article 24,
Germany may participate in collective security actions under the
auspices of the United Nations, NATO, and the WEU as long as
they are "permissible under public international law and can be
said to create or secure peace."2 3 1 Because the Two Plus Four
222.
Emil J. Kirchner & James Sperling, From Instability to Stability, In THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND NATO 1. 14 (Emil Kirchner and James Sperling
eds., 1992).
223.
Michael Anders, New Leader Rouses Social Democratsfor Comeback

After Crisis, Agence France-Presse, Nov. 17, 1995, available in 1995 WL
11472042.
224. Id.
225. Crawford & Halfnann, supra note 48, at 235.
226. Id. at 217.
227. Schmidt, supra note 63, at 27.
228. Peters, supranote 150, at 65.
229. Crawford & Halfmann. supranote 48, at 222-23.
230. Fitchett, supra note 178, at 1.
231. Kress. supra note 51, at 419.
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Treaty specifically confirms Germany's right to use force in
accordance with the Basic Law, the only remaining requirement
for use of force is that it be approved by a majority vote of
Parliament.
Germany will have many opportunities to use this new-found
sovereignty. Although there appears to be little chance of a major
war in Europe in the foreseeable future,2 3 2 the end of the strong
restraint formerly exercised by the former Soviet Union over
Eastern Europe respective camps has rekindled ethnic, religious,
and economic differences.2 3 3 As a result, the United States,
Britain, and France have pushed for more active German military
participation in collective security agreements. 23 4 The German
leadership understands that the United States wants Europe to
and that Germany must
be more responsible for its own security
2 35
shoulder a large part of that load.

It is likely that the German Parliament will respond favorably
to this responsibility and approve collective security actions in
support of the United Nations, NATO, and the WEU. In the past,
Germany has shown a preference for acting in a multinational
role.23 6

The German government's recent decision to assist in

Bosnia demonstrates a growing acceptance of a military
responsibility to its allies. 2 37 The voting margin of the decision in
Parliament adds credence to the view that Germany has willfully
accepted that role. Still, Parliament should not be expected to
blindly approve every request for military assistance. Chancellor
Kohl made it clear that although Germany recognizes its
international responsibilities, it will continue to make the decision

Dieter Dettke. Civil Foreign Policy: German Domestic Constraints and
232.
New Security Arrangements In Europe, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 250,

252 (Beverly Crawford, ed., 1992). Although Russia still has a powerful military.

the loss of forward basing in the former Warsaw Pact countries and a reduced
military posture would give the West much more notice of impending attack. This

makes such an attack unlikely. Id.
233. Sanderson, supra note 106. at 35. When invasion of Europe by the
Soviet Union was the primary threat to NATO security interests, Germany's will
and ability to defend its own territory was sufficient to meet Western needs. Now
that the primary security interests have changed, there is a need for Germany to
contribute to actions outside of its own territory. Schmidt, supra note 63, at 3132.
234. Germany'sExpanding Role. supra note 6, at A14.
235. Following the announcement of the 1994 FCC decision, Chancellor
Kohl stated, ".. . America needs a Europe that assumes greater responsibility for
itself and for international security. We Germans know that our security and our
foreign-policy capability depend on our being reliable partners and our allies
having confidence in us." Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.
236. Van De Berg, supra note 176, at B5.
237. Id.
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to use force "on a case-by-case basis."238 Each decision will no
doubt

take

into account

whether

the

request

involves

a

peacekeeping or peacemaking operation.
1. Support of Multilateral Peacekeeping Operations
Germany will be expected to support more peacekeeping
operations in the future. The number of such actions is on the
rise, 23 9 and the United Nations has asked Germany to participate
fully in future military operations. 240 In light of a recent U.N.
study suggesting that all permanent members of the Security
Council should contribute to peacekeeping operations, Germany's
bid for a permanent Security Council seat gives it added Incentive
to participate in peacekeeping. 24 1 Since NATO has also taken on
a peacekeeping role, Germany's involvement in future NATO
24 2
actions will be critical to attempts to bring stability to Europe.
The 1994 FCC decision gives a clear "green light" to use of
German military forces for multilateral peacekeeping under Article
24 of the Basic Law.2 43 The lopsided vote supporting operations
in Bosnia, which have been couched in terms of a "NATO-led
peacekeeping, not peacemaking, mission,"2 44 shows that

Parliament fully supports such actions. Even the new head of the
opposition SPD confirms that his party supports "participation in
.peace operations' under the United Nations." 245 The German
people also support peacekeeping operations, and the German
military, even in its reduced state, is adequate to support such
contingencies. 2 46 Barring some unforeseen change, German
participation in future peacekeeping operations appears to be a
forgone conclusion.
2. Multilateral Peacemaking and Beyond

German participation in multilateral peacemaking operations
is somewhat less certain. There is no constitutional problem with
such action. The FCC ruled that Article 24 includes authority for
238. Remarks by President Clinton, Chancellor Kohl, and PresidentDelors at
the Relchtag in Berlin on July 12, U.S. Newswire, July 16. 1994, available In 1994
WL 8283372.
239.
From 1990 to 1994, the United Nations began 14 peacekeeping
operations, more than the total number of actions in its history to that point.
Rossman, supra note 104, at 240-41.
240.
Schmidt, supra note 63, at 29.
241.
Bring, supra note 112, at 63-64.
242.
See Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.

243.

Wlegandt, supra note 75, at 890.

244.
245.
246.

Van De Berg, supra note 176, at B5.
Anders, supra note 223.
See supra notes 185 and 188 and accompanying text.
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participation in coercive actions such as those brought under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 2 47 In the case of peacemaking
operations, however, it will be more difficult to obtain
Parliamentary support. The new leader of the SPD has come out
The
against "combat missions" for the German military. 2 48
German people may not be supportive of such actions. Former
Defense Minister Volker Ruhe has suggested that it could be a
decade before the German people2 49are psychologically receptive to
the external use of military force.

Nevertheless, the ruling government is preparing for these

types of contingencies.

It has created a 50,000 man, all

volunteer, rapid reaction force designed for combat missions
outside of Europe. 21 0 This force is clearly too large for standard
peacekeeping missions. In addition, Germany lobbied hard to
provide the commander for NATO's new ARRC. 25 1 While Germany
lost out to the British in the end, the very fact that it was
interested suggests increasing support for external combat
operations. Finally, military planners have been preparing for
operations in potential trouble spots like North Africa and the
Middle East if they are necessary to protect German interests in
These actions suggest a government
strategic materials. 25 2
future
peacemaking operations.
to
engage
in
willing
Other factors also point toward Germany becoming more
involved in future peacemaking. Pressure for this type of action
will come from Germany's allies in the same way as it will for
In addition, although the United States and
peacekeeping.
French governments have supported Germany's bid for a
permanent seat on the Security Council, 25 3 final selection, by
Charter, must be based in part on the member's "contribution to
If
the maintenance of international peace and security."2 5 4
selected, Germany will be expected to deploy troops in support of
U.N. actions around the world. 2 55 For these reasons, Germany is
likely to move toward support of peacemaking operations in the
future.

247.
248.

Kress, supra note 51, at 417.
Ian Traynor, SPD Fudges but Returns Home Cheered, GUARDIAN,

November 18, 1995, at 016.
249. Qu'est-ce qu'onfalt? Ich weiss nlcht, supra note 158, at 53.
250.
251.
252.

Fitchett, supranote 178, at 1.
Mclnnes, supra note 131, at 100.
An internal Bundeswehr report,

quoted

in

several

German

publications. implied that actions might be taken to preserve "political, economic,
military and ecological stability." Fisher, supra note 5. at A27.
253.
Smith, supra note 121, at 185.
254. Id. at 178.
255.
Id. at 188-189.
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C. UnilateralIntervention in Support of ForeignPolicy
After more than forty years of having its security policy
defined by NATO and the United States, Germany has become
comfortable working within the confines of multilateral security
arrangements. 25 6 During this period, German national interests
played a secondary role in defining security policy. 2 57 The return
of full military sovereignty now presents Germany with the
possibility of taking unilateral action in support of its own
national interests.
Three sources of crisis are potentially important enough to
German interests that they might lead to unilateral action. First,
Germany's national interests are heavily tied up in its world class
economy and the foreign trade that helps fuel it. 2 58

A security

crisis that threatens the German economy or foreign trade could
present the potential for unilateral use of force. 2 59 Second,
because Germany has strong economic and political interests in
the stability of Eastern Europe, 26 0 any destabilization in this area
would be a major threat to Germany's national interest. 2 6 1 A

256.

As Emil Kirchner et al. explain:

Since the 1950s, Germany's position in the international political system
and its security policy were fairly well defined, because fundamental
decisions were largely made for it. Since that time, Germany's political
elite has enjoyed a consensus on two major points. First, Germany must
remain firmly anchored in the Western security system; and second, it was
necessary for Germany to participate in multilateral frameworks on a cooperative basis. Multilateralism was slowly transformed into an end in
itself.
Emil Kirchner et al., Introduction, 'in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 6
(Christoph Bluth et al. eds.. 1995).
257. Schmidt, supranote 63, at 25.
258. Schwarz, supra note 163, at 89. Schwarz suggests that the high costs
of reunification and a corresponding dependence on world capital markets to pay
for it have put Germany in a position of acting in an even more "narrowly defined
national interest" where its economy is involved. Id. at 91-92.
259.
As Crawford & Halfmann point out: "Countries with great-power

economies have increasingly acquired far-flung interests. If those interests
conflict with the interests of other powerful states, the temptation to augment
economic power with appropriate military capabilities arises."
Crawford &
Halfmann, supranote 48, at 216.
260.
Schwarz, supra note 163, at 98-99. Schwarz notes that Germany is
equally important to Eastern and Southeastern European countries and that
these countries have high expectations of a continuing German role in this area.
Id. at 86. This suggests that German national interests in this area will become
even more important as these countries continue to democratize and draw away
from the former Soviet Union.
261.
Id. at 101. The possible destabilization of Eastern Europe Is a very real
concern unless their economies begin to improve. Dettke suggests that "if living
conditions [in Eastern Europe] decline further, the potential for social and ethnic
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serious security threat in Eastern Europe presents a strong
justification for unilateral action. 2 6 2 Finally, a breakup of NATO
and the failure of European collective security could force
protect its national interests and
Germany to act unilaterally to
2 63
its position as a major power.
In order to take unilateral military action, however, Germany
The appropriate
needs to overcome several legal obstacles.
analysis would vary depending on whether Germany was
defending another country from external attack or intervening in
another country's internal affairs (for example, attempting to
resolve a civil war or protect human rights). First, in order to
meet the mandates of Article 26 of the Basic Law and Article 2 of
the Two Plus Four Treaty, Germany would have to show that the
action was not "aggressive." The FCC would probably not deem
defense of another country from external attack "aggressive," but
intervention in another country's internal struggle might meet the
The determination would be based on the
definition.
circumstances of the case.
A second stumbling block to unilateral action would be
Article 25 of the Basic Law. This article would be violated if the
action was contrary to international law. 2 64 While Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter would permit Germany to assist another country
in its right of self-defense, 265 a unilateral intervention in a

country's internal affairs could be considered a violation of Article
2 of the U.N. Charter. 2 66 Nevertheless, some states have found
justifications to maneuver around the plain meaning of Article

conflict will increase and possibly even endanger the emerging and still fragile
democratic institutions." Dettke. supra note 232, at 254.
262. Schwarz suggests that German military action would be critical to the
defense of Eastern Europe because of Germany's geographic position and the low
probability that other Western European powers would be willing to take risks in
the area. Schwarz. supra note 163, at 88. Indeed, some German officials have
already spoken of protecting Eastern European interests in almost a "Monroe
Doctrine" kind of way. Crawford & Halfmann, supranote 48, at 217.
263. Schwarz suggests a scenario where the WEU wins out over NATO and
the United States withdraws from Europe. In such a situation, he finds it unlikely
that Germany would continue allowing its security policy to be set by France and
Britain and would turn instead to acting in its own national interest. Schwarz,
supra note 163, at 97. Deprived of workable collective security arrangements,
Germany would act unilaterally to protect its interests. Crawford & Halfmann,
supra note 48, at 245.
264. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
265. Article 51 provides in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See also Houck, supra note 125, at 13.
266. See supranote 120 and accompanying text.
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Although a supportable argument against unilateral action
could be made based on Article 25, the FCC would be unlikely to
use this as a basis for a ruling.
Probably the strongest argument against unilateral use of
force can be made based on Article 87a, Section 2, of the Basic
Law. This would be essentially the same argument made by the
opposition in the 1994 FCC case. 268
In that case, the FCC
dismissed the argument because it found that Article 24 implicitly
permitted the use of force within the confries of collective security
agreements. 2 69
Unilateral actions, however, could not claim
protection under Article 24. Any such action, therefore, would
have to meet Article 87a's mandate that it be for defensive
purposes. 2 70 While the-FCC has not ruled on the exact definition
of the "defense caveat," commentators have argued that it
requires a "finding by the [Parliament] that [Germany] is under
attack or that an attack is imminent. '2 7 1 Clearly, the majority of
unilateral actions would not meet this requirement. As a result,
the FCC would probably declare unilateral use of force
unconstitutional.
Based on the authority of the Basic Law, a ruling of
unconstitutionality by the FCC would effectively end any attempt
at the unilateral use of force. 27 2 One possible method to allow
such use of force would be to amend the Basic Law. The Basic
Law, however, is structured to preserve the status quo and limit
the power of the state.
Such a change would be difficult,
especially given the current attitudes in Parliament.2 73 The only
2.267

267.
See Fink. supra note 113, at 7 (pointing to interventions "to support
self-determination, socialism (Brezhnev Doctrine), democracy (Reagan Doctrine)
and humanitarian interventions.").
268.
See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
269.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
270.
According to Kress:
Given the Court's insistence on not deciding the issue [of whether Article
87a(2) governs the external use of armed forces outside of systems of
mutual collective security), caution Is called for here. It seems at least as
likely that, if faced with this specific Issue, the Court would attribute
decisive weight to the wording rather than to the drafting history of Article
87a(2) and affirm its applicability to the external use of the armed forces
outside collective security systems.
Kress, supra note 51, at 420.
271.
Kilimnik, supra note 85, at 128 n.56 (referring to Article 115a of the
Basic Law).
272. The constitution grants the FCC authority to ensure the "Basic Law
will prevail over all legal rules or state actions that would subvert or offend It."
Kommers, supra note 16. at 847.
273. Id. at 853. Amending the Basic Law requires a two-thirds vote in
Parliament which is unlikely given the opposition party's strict opposition to the
use of force for the "projecting of power in the national interest." Fisher, supra
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other alternative would be to replace the Basic Law with a new
constitution for the unified Germany under Article 146. Since
reunification, however, the Basic Law has taken on the character
of a permanent constitution, and thus, it is unlikely that it will be
replaced. 2 74 Even if a new constitution were to be subjected to a
referendum of the German people, it is unlikely that their current
any reduction of the current restraints
attitudes would support
2 75
on the use of force.
Finally, there are other factors that suggest that a unilateral
use of force is unlikely. The German military, due to its reduced
size and morale problems, could probably not sustain a major
In addition, any such action would
external intervention.
undoubtedly be disfavored by part or all of the international
community.
Germany's neighbors are accustomed to having

German military policy anchored firmly within the policies of
Unilateral operations have the
NATO or the United Nations.
potential for renewing old fears and hindering Germany's
international relations. For these reasons, Germany is unlikely to
undertake any unilateral use of force in the foreseeable future.
within the
Instead, any German action is likely to remain
276
guidelines of multilateral security agreements.
D. Nationalismand a Return to Aggression
Of all the potential paths Germany could take, a return to
Such action is
nationalistic aggression is the least likely.
27 7
incompatible with the national culture of today's Germany.
Unlike earlier this century, Germany no longer has outstanding
2 78
Article 1 of
claims to territories occupied by other countries.
note 5, at A27 (quoting Karsten Voigt, an SPD legislator on the Parliamentary
Defense Committee).
274. See Kommers, supra note 16, at 837 (noting the authority given the
Basic Law by the passage of time and the decision by East Germany to accept it
during reunification rather than demand a new constitution).
275. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
276. Peters, supra note 150, at 72. After the 1994 FCC decision was
announced, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel provided assurances that
there was no threat of Germany acting unilaterally. In his words, "Germany...
does not want to become the world police." Nelson, supra note 166, at 1.
277. The opinions of the commentators appear united on this point. See
Van De Berg, supra note 176, at B5 ("we have got the most benevolent united
Germany has undergone a democratic
Germany that history has seen.
evolution."); Farmer, supra note 1 ("The new Germany is physically and
psychologically far different from the country created a century ago out of

Prussian ambition, which produced two World Wars. Its relations with its
neighbors, East and West, are vastly different."); Peters, supra note 150, at 58-59
(".

.

. in its forty-year history the Federal Republic has repeatedly demonstrated

its liberal, democratic values and commitment to a stable, secure Europe.").
278. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 55, art. 1.
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the Two Plus Four Treaty states, "The united Germany has no
territorial claims whatsoever against other states and shall not
assert any in the future."2 79 Germany's integration with NATO
and the WEU also makes it improbable that its national interest
would ever diverge sufficiently from the interests of those
organizations to incite unilateral aggressive action.
In addition, such aggressive action would be unquestionably
illegal under both international and German constitutional law.
It would violate the U.N. Charter and the Two Plus Four Treaty.
As a result, such action would violate Article 25 of the Basic Law.
It would also violate the ban on the use of aggressive force in
Article 26 of the Basic Law and would theoretically subject all of
the government officials involved in the action to criminal
sanctions. Finally, aggressive action would violate the Article 87a

requirement that German forces be used for only defensive
purposes.
Although the Basic Law could theoretically be amended to
allow for the aggressive use of force, it is unlikely that the
German government could muster the required two-thirds
majority. The fervent nationalism necessary to support such a
policy no longer exists in Germany. 28 0 Furthermore, none of the
major parties would support such a concept. Although right-wing
extremist parties do exist, none have ever received enough votes
to garner a single seat in Parliament. 28 1 This situation is unlikely
to change in the future, given that German voters' behavior has
increasingly become tied to economic interests and Germans
would see little benefit in such nationalist policies. 28 2 Hard core
right-wing voters, like right-wing parties, do exist, but they
28 3
comprise a small minority of the total population.
Even an unexpected change in the German electorate,
resulting in the election of parties willing to eliminate the
constitutional restrictions, would still face a formidable foe in the
FCC. The FCC could use its authority under Article 21 to declare
the parties unconstitutional and strip them of their Parliamentary
seats. 28 4 This is not an idle threat as the FCC has declared

279.
280.
feeds on
provided

Id.
As Crawford and Halfmann explain, "[Niationalism or patriotism, which
a population's pride in the 'achievements' of a nation and which has
Ideological guidelines for Germany's past foreign policies, no longer

functions as a basis for pursuing national security interests in today's Germany."

Crawford & Halfmann, supra note 48, at 240.
281.
282.
283.

Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Schwarz, supra note 163, at 92.

284.

Article 21(b) provides in part:

Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents,
seek to impair or abolish the free democratic order or to endanger the
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28 5
political parties unconstitutional on two occasions in the past.
Finally, if a government bent on aggressive action were to take
power and attempt to amend the Basic Law, the FCC would still
have one last line of defense. German constitutional law gives the
FCC the authority to void "any constitutional amendment
conflicting with the core values or spirit of the Basic Law as a
whole. 28 6
Presumably, any attempt to remove military
restrictions so basic to German constitutional history would be
considered unconstitutional.

V.

CONCLUSION

The German potential to use military force must be
understood in the context of forty years of legal restraints and
security policies dictated by multilateral security organizations.
While the 1994 FCC decision opens the door for sovereign use of
force, numerous social and political factors influence the selection
of a security option. These factors include: the will of the
German people and their Parliament, the demands and fears of
Germany's allies and European neighbors, the state of the
German military, and Germany's goals in the international arena.
The scope of possible action will also be constrained by remaining
restrictions enforced through international agreements and the
Basic Law itself.
The spectrum of potential military use ranges from a policy of
semi-neutrality and self-defense to aggressive action based on
nationalist interests. Within this range of options, Germany is
most likely to accept external responsibilities, but only within the
multilateral framework of the United Nations, NATO, and the
WEU. The constitutionality of such action is clearly supported by
the FCC and the German Parliament and the German people are
supportive at least to the extent of peacekeeping operations. In
the long term, as the German public accepts its international role,
Germany is likely to support peacemaking operations as well.
There is little chance that Germany will begin acting
unilaterally. There are several restrictions in the Basic Law that
existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The
Federal Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of
unconstitutionality.
GG,supra note 3, art. 21 (emphasis added). The FCC could base the action on
the argument that attempts to take aggressive military action were contrary to the
democratic order or that such action in violation of international law might invite
retaliation which would endanger the continued existence of Germany.
285. The FCC outlawed a neo-Nazi party in 1952 and the German
Communist Party in 1956. Kommers, supra note 16, at 854.
286. Id. at 852 (emphasis added).
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would prevent such actions, and the German Parliament is not
supportive of amendments to allow the unilateral use of force.
Aggressive actions based on nationalist interests are even less
likely and would have to find their way through multiple layers of
legal checks before they could emerge. These legal restraints, the
watchful eye of the international community, and the modern
German culture make Germany far less likely to engage in
unilateral action than the United States or Russia.
In the end, Germany's resources, industry, and ability to
equip and maintain a large military force demand that it accept
its share of responsibility in the post-cold war world. 28 7 Germany
realizes that by staying out of the Gulf War, it missed a chance to
assume a position of leadership in world affairs. 2 88 It is unlikely
to make that mistake again. By supporting U.N. operations since
the Gulf War, Germany has proven that it can shoulder its share
of the international security burden "without awakening historical
ghosts. '2 89
In the words of Vernon Walters, former U.S.
Ambassador to West Germany, "Fears of a resurgent Germany
rising up to dominate Europe are unfounded, . . . [t~he Germans
have learned that hard work is more profitable than war."12 9 0 It is
time for the world to stop fearing the reemergence of German
arms and encourage Germany to accept its rightful role in the
international community.
Walter J. Lemanskl
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